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Abstract 
Trade-weighted aggregated tariffs (TWPT) are often used in analyzing the issues of 
erosion of non-reciprocal preferences. This paper argues that commonly used TWPTs 
under-estimate the true protection on imports originated from preference-receiving 
countries, including LDCs. When used in numerical simulations of preference erosion 
and expansion scenarios, the TWPTs tend to incorrectly downplay preference erosion 
effect of MFN tariff cuts, and understate the export promotion effect of expanding 
preferences. In light of these claims, an alternative aggregation scheme is developed 
to calculate aggregated preferential tariffs imposed by a number of developed coun-
tries on African LDCs. These are shown to be higher than the TWPTs aggregated 
from the same disaggregated tariff data set. Numerical simulations conducted with 
the two sets of aggregated tariffs confirm the two claims and suggest that TWPTs may 
lead to misleading policy implications concerning expanding preferences for the 
LDCs. 
 
 
                                                 
∗ The author thanks Alan Matthews for useful discussion and participants of the 9th Annual Confer-
ence on Global Economic Analysis held in Addis Ababa in June 2006 for helpful comments on an 
earlier draft of the paper.  
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1.  Introduction 
The recent Hong Kong WTO Ministerial Declaration adopted on December 18, 2005 
(WTO, 2005) reconfirmed the Doha ministerial decision that “…developed-country 
Members, and developing-country Members declaring themselves in a position to do 
so, agree to implement duty-free and quota-free market access for products originat-
ing from LDCs”.1 Underlying this declaration is the concern of preference erosion in 
connection with expected multilateral trade liberalization.2 
 
For policy analysts, examining the extent of erosion of agricultural trade preferences 
requires accurate measurement of the prevailing Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariff 
rates imposed on non-preferential imports and the corresponding preferential rates 
levied on imports originated from the preference-receiving countries, the differences 
of which are often called the preference margins. Reducing preference margin 
through unilateral or multilateral MFN tariff reforms may lead to preference erosion. 
Since model-based numerical assessments of preference erosion are usually con-
ducted on aggregated product categories, it is necessary for analysts to aggregate tar-
iff rates at detailed line levels up to the levels of product categories, as is done in the 
GTAP database (Dimaranan and McDougall, 2002) where values of bilateral trade 
flows are used as weights in the aggregation. This practice, however, may lead to un-
der-estimation of the true market access barriers imposed by many countries on im-
ports originated from the LDCs, due to the fact that the LDCs typically only export a 
handful of products with very small volumes, implying that the aggregate tariff for 
many products would turn out to be zero of nearly zero.  
 
This under-estimation of aggregated tariffs imposed on LDCs’ exports has two seri-
ous implications for assessing the extent of preference erosions and for evaluating the 
merits of expanding current preferential treatment to the LDCs (as agreed in the Hong 
Kong declaration). The main propositions of this paper are: first, a smaller-than-actual 
trade-weighted preferential tariff (TWPT) will likely lead to an under-estimation of 
preference erosion effect of an MFN tariff cut (in terms of reduced exports from the 
LDCs); second, the trade-promotion effect of enhancing preferences by granting duty 
and quota free access to the LDCs will also be under-estimated when using the lower-
than-actual TWPT. Thus, the seriousness of preference erosions and the desirability 
                                                 
1 This was also included in the so-called July Package of 2004 (WTO, 2004). 
2 This has been pointed out by a number of studies, including Panagariya (2005). Numerical evi-
dence has also been provided in studies based on quantitative models, such as the study by Yu and 
Jensen (2005). 
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of granting duty and quota free market access to the LDCs would be regarded as in-
consequential, as claimed in a number of recent studies. 
 
The objective of the paper is to provide some theoretical discussion and numerical 
support for the above propositions regarding the consequences of incorrectly aggre-
gating preferential tariffs on estimating preference erosion effects and on evaluating 
the desirability of enhancing preferences for the purposes of mitigating possible ero-
sion of existing preferences. An alternative scheme for aggregation preference tariffs 
on imports from the LDCs is suggested. The advantage of this scheme is drawn from 
a series of simulation exercises. Due to the concentration of LDCs in Africa, the focus 
of this study is on the African LDCs (ALDCs hereafter). 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the policy issues of preference 
erosion and expanding preferential treatment for LDCs. This brings out the relevance 
of correctly representing aggregated preferential tariffs in quantitative analysis of 
these issues. Section 3 contains informal theoretical discussion on the likely conse-
quences (in terms of export quantities) of under-estimating levels of preferential tar-
iffs on the extent of preferences erosion and on the desirability of expanding preferen-
tial treatment. Section 4 proposes an alternative method for aggregating preferential 
tariffs and conducts numerical simulations to compare the different export effects of 
using the trade-weighted and the alternatively aggregated preferential tariffs. Section 
5 concludes. 
2. Preference erosion and enhancing preferential treatment for LDCs 
There have been ongoing debates on the desirability and feasibility of adopting the 
proposal of enhancing trade preferences for the LDCs. 3 Some worry about the inabil-
ity of preferences in promoting agriculture exports and economic development in the 
LDCs and discount the value of preferences as an effective measure of Special and 
Differential Treatment. This worry is compounded by the fear that the preferential 
approach may slow down the multilateral liberalization process. Others point out that 
developing countries in general could gain more from market access reforms based on 
                                                 
3 In fact, whether developing countries gain more from MFN tariff cuts or lose more from prefer-
ence erosions has long been discussed in the literature. Some examples of earlier studies are Black-
hurst (1972), Baldwin and Murray (1977), and Pomfret (1986). More recent studies can be found in 
the summary contained in Bureau et al. (2007), which states that “the authors who point out the poor 
performance of countries that benefited from these preferences have seldom provided convincing 
evidence about the counterfactual situation without preferences. Econometric results are ambigu-
ous…” (page 176-177, Bureau et al., 2007).  
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the MFN approach and that the erosion of preferences  does not appear to be a serious 
issue if substantial MFN reforms are conducted multilaterally. Still others argue that 
the LDCs do not necessarily gain from multilateral trade reforms, that the existing 
preferences are important to their interests, and that enhanced preferences would help 
mitigate any adverse effects from multilateral reforms.4 Lastly, many have noticed 
that various conditions, clauses and rules attached to existing preference programs 
may have hindered recipient countries from taking full advantage of these programs 
and therefore preferences per se should not be held responsible for the poor export 
performance of the LDCs. Instead of giving up on preferences altogether, some argue 
that improving these rules will make them more effective.5 Clearly, this debate has im-
portant implications for the LDCs. If indeed preference erosion appears not to be a 
serious concern, then there would be no point in worrying about possible negative 
consequences of the multilateral agenda. On the other hand, if preference erosion is 
non-negligible, then the call for expanding preference programs should be taken seri-
ously.  
 
Numerical model-based simulation exercises have a role to play in this debate. For 
example, using the GTAP model (Hertel, 1997) and database, one can simulate policy 
scenarios involving MFN/preferential tariff reductions by preference-granting coun-
tries to estimate the magnitude of preference erosion/expansion effects. With a correct 
representation of the MFN and preferential trade barriers, these exercises may gener-
ate useful policy insights. Nevertheless, simulation exercises involving MFN and 
preferential tariffs by many countries have high data requirement and most likely 
these exercise can be only conducted in the context of product categories, which re-
quires aggregation of tariff lines.  
 
In the case of LDCs, preferences enjoyed by these countries are typically more favor-
able than what are offered to other developing countries. However, even for them, ex-
isting preference programs often do not provide universal production coverage, leav-
ing intact high import barriers on the excluded products. For instance, data from the 
USITC data web show that out of around 1800 US tariff lines in agriculture, about 
400 MFN tariff lines are duty free. Among the remaining tariff lines, about 1100 lines 
                                                 
4 Bureau, Chakir and Jacques (2007) show that contrary to assertions by many authors, agricultural 
preferences granted by the EU and US were largely utilized by the beneficiary countries. Other pa-
pers on the importance of agricultural preferences based on their utilization rates include: Wainio 
and Gehlhar (2004), Wanio and Gibson (2004), and Inama (2004).   
5 Blandford (2007) discusses in details the limitations of existing preference schemes for the LDCs 
and touches upon ways to address these limitations.  
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are duty free for the LDCs through the US preference programs.6 However, these pre-
ferences only lower the simple average tariffs faced by the LDCs marginally (from an 
overall simple average of 9.7 percent to 5.6 percent for the GSP-LDC countries). This 
is because the dutiable tariff lines not covered in the preference programs generally 
have higher tariffs than those of covered products. Therefore, one would expect non-
trivial trade barriers for the excluded products that originate from the LDCs. Ideally, 
this protection pattern should be correctly presented in the aggregated databases that 
are used in quantitative studies aiming at analyzing the issues relating to preferences 
and multilateral trade liberalization. Failing to preserve the protection pattern may 
lead to biased estimates regarding the extent of preference erosion. The specific con-
sequences are explored in the next section. 
3. Schemes for aggregating preferential tariffs and consequences for numeri-
cally simulating export quantity effects 
Aggregation exercise using trade weights – as is done in the GTAP database – may 
distort the structure of preferential tariffs facing preference-receiving countries, espe-
cially the LDCs, due to the fact that typically LDCs export only a narrow range of 
products and volumes of these exports tend to be quite small. As such, the trade-
weighted aggregated tariff may very well be under-estimated. Appendix Tables A1 
and A2 provide the bilateral exports of 17 agricultural and food products (grouped ac-
cording to the GTAP classification) from two aggregated Sub-Saharan African groups 
into major trading countries/regions for the year 2001. The first group, SSA-1, in-
cludes six individual African LDCs (Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, 
Madagascar and Uganda) appearing in the original GTAP database version 6, whereas 
other African LDCs are largely included in an aggregated Rest of Sub-Sahara African 
(SSA-2) region. For clarities in presentation, bilateral exports less than US$1 million 
are shaded in the tables. Obviously, most cells in the two tables are shaded, with 
many of them actually being zeroes. With this trade pattern, many trade weights used 
for computing aggregated tariffs will be zeroes, resulting in under-estimated aggre-
gated tariffs on imports originated from the ALDCs. 
 
To make the point more concrete, consider the case of trade-weighted aggregated tar-
iffs imposed by the US on imports originated from the ALDCs, which are presented 
in the middle panel of Table 1. Not surprisingly, these are all zeroes except for sugar 
                                                 
6 These are drawn from the summary compiled by Breton and Ikezuki (2004), and Wainio and 
Gehlhar (2004). 
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and other crops, which portraits a very different protection pattern from our earlier 
discussion based on detailed tariff data from the USITC data web. The reason for this 
apparent inconsistency between the aggregated and disaggregated data is exactly due 
to the use of the trade-weights – according to Appendix Tables 1 and 2, sugar and 
other crops are two of the three products which registered non-negligible exports from 
the two African groups to the US. Because these African countries are not able to ex-
port to the US in most other products, tariff barriers they are facing disappear in the 
trade-weighted aggregation process, despite the possibilities that in the absence of 
such barriers, these countries might be able to export those products. 
 
So what does this imply for evaluating the extent of preference erosion and for exam-
ining the merits of expanding preference programs (as stipulated in the Hong Kong 
WTO ministerial declaration)? Two claims are developed here: 
 
Claim 1. Using underestimated aggregated preferential tariffs according to the trade-
weighted scheme in simulating scenarios of MFN tariff cuts by preference-granting 
countries would likely result in smaller preference erosion effects. 
  
Claim 2. Using underestimated aggregated preferential tariffs according to the trade-
weighted scheme in simulating scenarios of expanding preferences would lead to a 
downward bias in the predicted export promotion effect of expanding preference pro-
grams. 
 
In the case of African LDCs (ALDCs), when the TWPTs are used in relevant policy 
simulations, the first claim suggests that the preference erosion effects would be not 
as serious, whereas the second claim implies that the benefits from enhancing prefer-
ences for purposes of compensating LDCs’ loss from preference erosion would be 
downplayed. Together, analyses based on TWPTs would incorrectly downplay the 
degree and extent of preference erosion and discount the potential benefits from en-
hancing preferences.  
 
Intuitions of these claims can be revealed from a typical one good, three-country 
model setting. Suppose country G is the preference-granting country, who gives a 
lower specific preference tariff p to the favored preference-receiving country R and 
imposes a higher specific MFN tariff m on imports from the rest of world W. For sim-
plicity, assume that there is only one good being traded, with G being the importer 
and R and W being the exporters. Now consider two situations characterized the same 
trade flow x between R to G, the same MFN tariff rate m imposed on exports from W, 
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but different specific preferential tariff rates p. Specifically, let us assume Situation A 
is defined by a higher initial preferential tariff ph, whereas Situation B is featured by a 
lower preferential tariff pl. By construct, the initial preferential margin in A (i.e. m-ph) 
is smaller than that in B (i.e. m-pl). Defining exports from R to G as a function of m 
and p, since the initial exports are the same in the two situations, we have 
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As the two types of aggregated tariffs lead to the same export with the same MFN tar-
iff m, equation (1) simply says that xA and xB represent two different export demand 
curves (for exports from country R) by country G. In particular, xB describes the ex-
port demand curve calibrated to the TWPTs (which are lower than the actual prefer-
ential protection) whereas xA represents the export demand curve calibrated to the true 
preferential tariffs. Both these export demand curves decrease in the preferential tariff 
p and increase in the MFN tariff m. 
 
To reveal the intuition of Claim 1, allow the preference-granting country G to imple-
ment an MFN tariff cut m∆ , which results in a lower MFN tariff (m- m∆ ) and 
smaller preference margins (m- m∆ -ph) and (m - m∆ -pl) respectively for Situations A 
and B. While absolute reductions to the preference margins are the same for both A 
and B, the relative reductions to the preference margins differ between the two situa-
tions. Specifically, the relative reduction to the (larger) preference margin will be 
)/( lpmm −∆  in Situation B, which is smaller than )/( hpmm −∆ , the relative re-
duction to the (smaller) preference margin in Situation A. That is, the smaller initial 
preference margin under A would be reduced/eroded relatively more than the larger 
initial preference margin under B. Since by assumption the two initial preference 
margins result in the same initial preferential export flow x from country R to country 
G, one would expect that the effective impact of a relatively larger erosion of prefer-
ence margin (as in Situation A) on the preferential export flow would be larger. With 
the normal assumption that lowering MFN tariff reduces preferential exports, this 
claim can be summarized algebraically by the following: 
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In other words, the preference erosion effect of reducing the MFN tariff (in terms of 
reduced preferential exports) is smaller when the initial preferential tariff is underes-
timated. 
 
The intuition of Claim 2 is straightforward. To see this, consider a preferential tariff 
reduction action (i.e. expanding preferences) by G that reduces p to zero. In Situation 
B, with a low initial preferential tariff pl , the effective increase in the preference mar-
gin is smaller than that in Situation A (with the high initial preferential tariff ph) be-
cause the absolute value of lp∆ (= - pl ) is smaller than that of hp∆ (= - ph ). It is then 
reasonable to expect that the export promotion effect of lowering p is smaller in Situa-
tion B than in Situation A. Essentially Claim 2 can be expressed as follows: 
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In other words, the export promotion effect of enhancing preferences (in terms of ex-
port volume) is smaller when the initial preferential tariff is underestimated. This in-
tuitive result can again be better illustrated by using the case of the US as an example 
and by referring to the TWPTs extracted from the GTAP version 6 database. If the 
TWPTs in the GTAP database are used for evaluating the desirability of implement-
ing the Hong Kong decision, meaningful concession would be achieved for only two 
product categories (see the middle panel of Table 1), which is in contradiction with 
the actual protection pattern mentioned earlier in the paper. As a result, smaller trade 
promotion effect would be resulted in, as compared to what would be obtained with a 
correct representation of the initial preferential protection structure. 
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4. Numerical simulation results under alternative aggregation schemes 
To check the validity of the above claims, we construct an alternative set of aggre-
gated tariffs that better capture the protection imposed on exports originated from the 
LDCs. Using these alternative tariffs (aggregated from the same source used for gen-
erating the TWPTs presented in Table 1), scenarios of MFN tariff reforms and ex-
panding preferences can be simulated and results from these simulations are then 
compared to those obtained from the same simulations based on the TWPTs. Com-
parisons between the two sets of aggregated tariffs and between the simulation results 
using the two sets of tariffs provide a direct test of the two claims summarized in 
equations (2) and (3).  
4.1. An alternative representation of protections imposed on exports from 
ALDCs 
One way to avoid using a sparse matrix of export values in aggregating tariffs is to 
apply the simple average scheme, whereby all reported tariff lines under each aggre-
gated product category are used for generating a simple average tariff.  Owing to the 
fact that there are usually only a few tariff lines (a fraction of total lines specified by 
the importing country) being reported for a typical LDC, following this simple aver-
age scheme on a bilateral basis would lead to an incomplete representation of actual 
barriers. This is because prohibitive tariffs and tariffs for non-produced or non-
exported products are likely not reported for the exporting LDC and thus not included 
in the aggregation. To remedy this problem, in calculating the simple average for a 
product category, tariff lines of that category reported for all ALDCs are pooled to-
gether. In doing so, it is assumed that for any given export destination, all ALDCs 
face the same import barriers.7 This assumption can be justified by observing that 
ALDCs are typically grouped together under existing preference programs and gener-
ally face the same preferential or MFN tariff barriers in a given market. As such, a 
certain tariff line recorded for one ALDC (which is producing that product) but not 
for another (which is not producing or exporting that product) may very well be the 
applicable rate for the latter, when the latter starts to produce/export under that line. 
 
The above procedure is applied to the source of the GTAP version 6 database at HS-6 
level, resulting in a different representation of agricultural trade barriers (including 
                                                 
7 Of course, the ALDCs face different barriers in different export destinations.  
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existing preferential tariffs) facing the ALDCs (denoted as “modified” hereafter).8 
Note that exactly the same concordance between the HS-6 and the GTAP classifica-
tions used for computing the TWPTs are applied in generating these simple average 
based tariffs. The upper panel of Table 1 reports modified tariffs imposed by selected 
countries on imports originated from the ALDCs. As compared to the original 
TWPTs from the GTAP database (“original” hereafter), the corresponding modified 
tariffs are generally larger. In the case of the US, tariff rates for oil seeds, sugar and 
milk are notably higher. For Japan, the difference is larger than 10 percentage points 
for seven products. For the two largest developing economics (China and India), the 
modified tariffs for many products are also significantly higher.9  
 
Using a GTAP data adjustment program named ALTERTAX, bilateral import tariffs 
imposed on exports from the ALDCs in the original GTAP database are re-set to the 
levels of the modified tariffs. While the adjustment leads to changes in tariffs, the 
program also seeks to minimize the impact to the trade flows recorded in the original 
GTAP database. This procedure results in a GTAP database characterized by the 
modified tariffs (denoted modified database hereafter). 
4.2. Experiment design 
Two sets of simulation exercises are conducted to respectively test the two claims 
listed in equations (2) and (3). Each of these simulations is conducted separately using 
the two databases (the original and the modified, which differ from each other only by 
the aggregated tariffs). These simulations are conducted with the same standard 
GTAP model (Hertel, 1997), a global computable general equilibrium model widely 
used in trade policy analysis. 
 
In the first scenario, MFN agricultural tariff reductions are assumed by a large prefer-
ence- granting region for the purposes of comparing the different preference erosion 
effects resulting from the two different representations of preferential tariffs. Here, a 
50% across-the-board MFN tariff reduction by the EU-25 is assumed.  
 
                                                 
8 The source tariff data at HS-6 level have been transferred into an MS Access database. An SQL 
query is developed to compute the simple average tariffs for all relevant bilateral trade flows in agri-
cultural and food products. 
9 Tariffs calculated for the EU25 is based on the applied ad valorem tariff and tariff equivalents of 
other protection measures recorded in the MacMaps data set. These numbers apparently reflect a 
pre-EBA protection structure on products from the LDCs. Also, they correspond to the pre-EU En-
largement situation. 
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The second set of simulations (containing two experiments) aims at evaluating the 
export promoting effects of implementing the Hong Kong declaration on expanding 
preferential treatment for the ALDCs, in the presence of MFN tariff reforms at the 
multilateral level. Specifically, the Hong Kong declaration is interpreted as “deepen-
ing”, “widening” and “broadening” trade preferences for the ALDCs (see Yu, 2007). 
Developed countries can “deepen” their preference programs by granting the ALDCs 
duty and quota-free market access to agricultural products that are covered in existing 
programs. They can “widen” the coverage of their preference programs by extending 
duty and quota-free access to currently un-covered agricultural products. Preferential 
market access for ALDC exports can also be “broadened” to include advanced devel-
oping countries to the group of preference-granting countries. The “deepening” and 
“widening” scenario is simulated in the first experiment, where the ALDCs are 
granted duty and quota-fee access to the agricultural and food markets of all devel-
oped countries, in conjunction with a 50% across-the-board MFN agricultural tariff 
reduction by all non-LDC countries. The second experiment adds another dimension 
to the enhancement of preferences for boosting exports from the African LDCs by 
“broadening” preferences. Taken together, the two experiments constitute the policy 
scenario envisioned by the Hong Kong WTO declaration. 
4.3. Results 
Claim 1 can be examined vis-à-vis the results from the first set of simulations on per-
centage changes in export quantities from the two African groups, as reported in the 
upper panel of Table 2. The erosion of preferences is reflected in the results of re-
duced exports for a number of products, especially vegetable and fruits, meats, sugar, 
and other foods, under both the original and modified databases. Comparing the re-
sults from using the original and the modified databases shows that in general the ab-
solute values of percentage changes in exports simulated from the modified database 
are greater than those obtained from the original database. Given the same exports 
and the same MFN tariff rates in the two databases and the same cuts to the MFN tar-
iff rates, the situation with lower initial preferential tariff rates (i.e. the original data-
base) downplays the extent and degree of preference erosions, as compared to the 
situation with higher initial preferential tariff rates (i.e. the modified database). These 
results are consistent with what is stated in Claim 1. 
 
Claim 2 can be evaluated against the results presented in the middle and lower panels 
of Table 2, which show the different export promoting effects of enhancing prefer-
ences. Specifically, the middle panel reports the results from the deepening and wid-
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ening scenario. In general, percentage changes in export quantities simulated from the 
modified database are significantly higher than those obtained from the original data-
base, suggesting that the export promotion effect is greater when the initial preferen-
tial tariff rates are higher.10 In other words, the trade promotion effects would be un-
derestimated should one choose to take the original GTAP database as given for ex-
amining the desirability of implementing the Hong Kong declaration. Numbers re-
ported in the lower panel of Table 2 (i.e. the “broadening” scenario) show similar re-
sults. Understandably, the differences tend to be larger than those listed in the middle 
panel, suggesting that broadening trade preferences leads to extra export promotion 
effects. It is also worth noting that these differences are generally much more signifi-
cant than those obtained from the upper panel of the same table, possibly implying a 
stronger support for Claim 2 than for Claim 1. 
 
In summary, the two claims as well as the numerical simulation results suggest that 
using trade-weighted preferential tariff rates may risk under-estimating both the ero-
sion effects of MFN tariff reforms and the export promotion effects of enhancing 
preferential treatment. In addition to these, it is also of interest to gauge the benefits to 
the ALDCs and the costs to the non-LDC countries due to the implementation of the 
Hong Kong declaration of expanding preferences. Results reported in Table 3 serve 
this purpose and reports the welfare effects results from an additional scenario of mul-
tilateral tariff cuts involving a 50% MFN agricultural tariff reduction by all non-LDCs 
is simulated, the deepening and widening scenario, and the broadening scenario dis-
cussed above. All results reported in Table 3 are based the modified database.11 
 
While the assumed multilateral MFN tariff reforms would benefit most non-LDC 
countries, the welfare effects turn out to be negative for the two African groups 
(losses of about US$50 million and 184 million for SSA-1 and SSA-2, respectively). 
In particular, in addition to lost export volumes (reported in appendix table 3), nega-
tive export price effect also plays an important role. This negative export price effect 
is due to two reasons. On the one hand, multilateral MFN reforms would lead to 
lower prices in the export markets and hence lower prices for those ALDC exports 
                                                 
10 Some percentage changes shown in the middle and lower panels of Table 2 are actually negative, 
due to the strong preference erosion effects of the multilateral MFN tariff cuts. Enhancing prefer-
ences help to bring down the negative changes. Furthermore, from Appendix Table 3 it can be seen 
that by taking into account the world market price effect of reducing MFN tariffs, it is clear that ex-
port volumes measured in US dollars are increasing for most products (see the middle and right 
panels of Table 3).  
 
11 Results on exports are provided in Appendix Table 3. 
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covered in preference programs. At the same time, lowering MFN market access bar-
riers would lead to higher prices for exports from countries not receiving preferential 
treatment. Hence, non-LDCs countries would be able to export and crowd out exports 
originated from the ALDCs. On the other hand, preferential access granted to the 
ALDCs would actually "trap" their exports and prevent them from shifting to other 
markets, thereby further dampening the prices of ALDCs' exports.12  
 
With preferences being deepened and widened, the negative welfare effects on the 
two African regions would be more than offset, leading to improved terms-of-trade 
and efficiency gains for them. For SSA-1, the total welfare improvement from the 
previous scenario would be over US$110 million, whereas for SSA-2 this would be 
almost US$800 million. Lastly, broadening preferences would generate similar ex-
ports expansion and welfare gains to the ALDCs. However, these additional gains are 
smaller than those obtainable from the action of deepening and widening preferences.  
 
The gains to non-LDCs from multilateral MFN reforms would be only reduced mar-
ginally due to the deepening, widening and broadening actions. Table 3 shows that 
deepening and widening trade preferences would lead to small terms-of-trade losses 
for developed countries, which for instance amount to a loss of US$582 million to the 
EU25, a paltry number in comparison to the gains obtained from the multilateral re-
forms. For non-LDC developing countries, the negative impact of widening and 
deepening preferential treatment for the ALDCs would also be very small, implying 
that the expansion of exports from the ALDCs would generally not be a big concern 
for them. For example, China and India would only suffer welfare losses of about 4 
and 17 million US dollars, respectively. Moreover, broadening preferences by the ad-
vanced developing countries would lead to very minor welfare losses for themselves 
as well. In summary, the cost of broadening and deepening preferences for ALDCs 
appear to be very minor to other countries. Although not presented here, the trade di-
version effects are also very small, a result that is consistent with the ALDCs’ very 
small export share in total world trade. Therefore, the concern on trade diversion does 
not appear to be a serious issue.   
                                                 
12 This is related to the Armington trade structure in the model, which specifies imports from differ-
ent sources as imperfect substitutes. So, trade patterns are somewhat persistent, despite changes in 
tariffs imposed on individual exporters. 
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5. Concluding remarks 
This paper argues that aggregated preferential tariffs calculated according to the 
trade-weighted aggregation scheme tend to underestimate the true import barriers im-
posed on imports originated from the LDCs, due to two reasons. First, the LDCs typi-
cally only export a narrow range of products. Second, the associated export volumes 
are generally very small. This downward bias impacts numerical simulations aiming 
at estimating preference erosion effects of multilateral trade liberalization and export 
promotion effects of expanding preferences in the spirit of the Hong Kong WTO dec-
laration. Two specific claims are offered. The first of these states that the downward 
bias would likely lead to underestimation of preference erosion effect of multilateral 
MFN tariff cuts. The second claim says that the export promotion effect would also 
be under-estimated with the biased aggregated preferential tariffs. 
 
Taking advantage of a global bilateral tariff database at the HS-6 level, an alternative 
simple average based aggregation scheme is developed and the resulting aggregated 
preferential tariffs imposed on the African LDCs are presented. These modified tariffs 
are generally higher than the trade-weighted tariffs contained in the GTAP database. 
Numerical simulations of policy scenarios pertaining to preference erosion and pref-
erence enhancement are conducted against both the modified and original GTAP da-
tabase. Results from these simulations provide support to the two claims. Having es-
tablished these results, it seems that there are amble reasons for supporting the Hong 
Kong WTO declaration regarding expanding preferences for the LDCs. More specifi-
cally, developed and other developing countries can expand the preferential treatment 
on products of LDC origins by deepening preference margins of products included in 
existing preference programs, by widening the coverage of existing preference pro-
grams, and by broadening the group of preference-granting countries. 
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Table 1.  Modified (simple average-based) vs. original (trade-weighted) GTAP tar-
iffs (%)  
 
Modified tariff based on a simple average scheme 
 Aus & 
NZL China Japan ASEAN Indian Canada USA
Argen-
tina Brazil EU25*
 
wheat 0.0 1.0 117.3 3.1 100.0 1.4 2.4 5.8 5.8 3.8
grains 0.0 1.2 19.8 10.3 47.1 0.0 0.3 5.1 5.9 1.7
Veg & fruits 0.3 17.4 31.3 12.4 39.6 0.1 1.3 9.6 9.6 6.6
oil seeds 0.5 12.5 1.9 9.5 35.9 0.0 9.9 5.2 5.5 1.0
plant fiber 0.0 2.6 0.0 1.5 11.8 0.0 1.2 7.6 8.9 0.3
other crops 0.0 16.2 2.1 19.4 38.8 0.1 2.3 10.4 10.6 2.7
other animal  0.0 8.1 0.9 1.7 8.0 1.5 0.2 5.4 4.7 1.6
bovine meats 0.0 28.6 29.8 11.3 32.5 6.3 1.9 11.5 11.9 14.1
other meats 0.4 16.6 36.9 10.5 59.4 47.8 0.7 11.3 12.5 11.2
vege oil 0.7 21.3 5.5 7.9 70.4 1.1 1.3 10.1 10.2 2.0
Milk 0.5 32.1 102.7 9.6 43.6 105.0 18.6 16.5 19.5 13.3
Rice 0.0 1.0 950.5 20.2 74.5 0.0 3.9 12.3 15.6 45.3
Sugar 2.8 18.1 207.1 21.4 52.8 2.5 25.4 17.5 17.5 63.9
other food 0.4 19.5 10.5 11.0 38.2 1.9 1.2 12.1 12.2 4.8
 
Original trade-weighted tariff as shown in the GTAP-6 database 
 
Wheat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Grains 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Vege & fruits 0 13.1 2.6 0.2 35.7 0 0 0 3.6 0.6
oil seeds 0.3 0 0 1.2 34.9 0 0 0 0 0
plant fiber 0 2.5 0 1.8 5.9 0 0 0 0 0
other crops 0 11.6 0 3.1 36.3 0 11.2 14.7 15.3 3.1
other animal 0 8.1 0 1.1 10.9 0.4 0 0 4.9 0.1
bovine meats 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
other meats 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1
vege oil 0 0 0 8.6 0 0 0 0 0 0
milk 0 0 12.7 3.9 0 0 0 0 0 0
rice 0 0 0 11.3 0 0 0 0 0 13.6
sugar 0 0 0 14.8 42.8 0 20.4 0 17.4 93.9
other food 0 15.4 1.2 34.8 28.5 0 0 0 0.8 0
 
Differences in percentage points = modified -original 
 
wheat 0 1 117.3 3.1 100 1.4 2.4 5.8 5.8 3.8
grains 0 1.2 19.8 10.3 47.1 0 0.3 5.1 5.9 1.7
Vege & fruits 0.3 4.3 28.7 12.2 3.9 0.1 1.3 9.6 6 6
oil seeds 0.2 12.5 1.9 8.3 1 0 9.9 5.2 5.5 1
plant fiber 0 0.1 0 -0.3 5.9 0 1.2 7.6 8.9 0.3
other crops 0 4.6 2.1 16.3 2.5 0.1 -8.9 -4.3 -4.7 -0.4
other animal 0 0 0.9 0.6 -2.9 1.1 0.2 5.4 -0.2 1.5
bovine meats 0 28.6 29.8 11.3 32.5 6.3 1.9 11.5 11.9 14.1
other meats 0.4 16.6 36.9 10.5 59.4 47.8 0.7 11.3 12.5 11.1
vege oil 0.7 21.3 5.5 -0.7 70.4 1.1 1.3 10.1 10.2 2
milk 0.5 32.1 90 5.7 43.6 105 18.6 16.5 19.5 13.3
rice 0 1 950.5 8.9 74.5 0 3.9 12.3 15.6 31.7
sugar 2.8 18.1 207.1 6.6 10 2.5 5 17.5 0.1 -30
other food 0.4 4.1 9.3 -23.8 9.7 1.9 1.2 12.1 11.4 4.8
 
Sources: GTAP 6 database and own calculations based on the disaggregated tariff data set the HS-6 level 
from which the GTAP tariffs are derived. 
*: Tariff data for the EU25 are aggregated from tariff lines for the year 2001. The Everything but Arms initiati-
ve is not reflected here. 
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Table 2.  Export quantity effects (% changes) under modified and original prefer-
ential tariffs, various scenarios 
 
EU25 MFN tariff cuts; no changes to 2001 preferential tariff 
                                 SSA-1                                                          SSA-2 
 
Original Modified
Modified –
original Original Modified 
Modified –
original
  
wheat 2.17 2.18 0.01 0.65 0.64 -0.01
grains -0.39 -0.43 -0.04 0.2 0.16 -0.04
Vege & fruits -2.51 -2.6 -0.09 -6.87 -6.92 -0.05
oil seeds 3.84 3.86 0.02 4.7 4.42 -0.28
plant fiber 1.6 1.61 0.01 1.91 1.9 -0.01
other crops 0.15 0.14 -0.01 -0.46 -0.5 -0.04
other animal 0.37 0.36 -0.01 -0.28 -0.31 -0.03
bovine meats -13.6 -14.26 -0.66 0.8 0.78 -0.02
other meats -1.94 -2.09 -0.15 -3.06 -3.12 -0.06
vege oil 0.93 0.94 0.01 -6.06 -6.09 -0.03
milk -0.21 -0.31 -0.1 -2.98 -3.06 -0.08
sugar -15.94 -16.05 -0.11 -47.12 -47.56 -0.44
other food -3.49 -3.51 -0.02 -2.95 -2.94 0.01
 
Multilateral MFN tariff cuts + deepening and widening preferences* 
  
wheat -3.3 0 3.3 -22.3 -14.1 8.2
grains -5.3 -2.3 3 -15.5 -10.7 4.8
Vege & fruits -15.7 -11.7 4 16.9 22.5 5.6
oil seeds -6.3 0.8 7.1 345.4 30.6 -314.8
plant fiber -4.6 -4.4 0.2 -10.3 -6.9 3.4
other crops 0.9 -3.4 -4.3 -19.6 -13.6 6
other animal -6 0.4 6.4 -9.3 -4.4 4.9
bovine meats -34.4 -13.7 20.7 -27.2 -20.3 6.9
other meats -20.6 13.3 33.9 58.5 31.6 -26.9
vege oil -14.3 -13.3 1 -26 -17.5 8.5
milk -14.4 166.1 180.5 5.5 52.4 46.9
sugar 237.2 243.2 6 602.4 629.3 26.9
other food -9.7 -5.4 4.3 -10.8 -7.9 2.9
 
Multilateral MFN tariff cuts + deepening & widening + broadening preferences** 
  
wheat -7.6 -3 4.6 -24.4 -14.9 9.5
grains -7.2 -3.5 3.7 -16.1 -10.3 5.8
Vege & fruits 30.4 41.4 11 23.9 30.9 7
oil seeds -8 -1.9 6.1 343.7 28.5 -315.2
plant fiber -3.3 -1.2 2.1 -5.8 0.1 5.9
other crops 2.3 0.4 -1.9 -18.9 -12.4 6.5
Other animal -6.9 -1.4 5.5 -9.5 -3 6.5
bovine meats -37.3 -3.5 33.8 -26.8 -18.3 8.5
other meats 82.1 69.2 -12.9 62.2 50.3 -11.9
vege oil -10.1 -9.3 0.8 -27 -18.1 8.9
milk -14.7 167 181.7 5 56 51
sugar 229.5 233.1 3.6 597.8 625.1 27.3
other food -8.2 -6.5 1.7 -4.8 -6 -1.2
 
Source: simulation results.  
*: results reported here are due to both the multilateral MFN tariff cuts and deepening and widening prefer-
ences. 
**: results reported here are due to the joint impact of the multilateral MFN tariff cuts, deepening and widen-
ing preferences, and broadening preferences. 
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Table 3.  Welfare results for selected countries/regions, based on the modified database (million US$) 
 
 Multilateral MFN tariff cuts* 
Multilateral MFN tariff cuts + deepening and widen-
ing preferences** 
Multilateral MFN tariff cuts + deepening & widening 
+ broadening preferences*** 
 Efficiency Terms of trade Total Efficiency Terms of trade Total Efficiency Terms of trade Total
 
Australia &  
New Zealand 4.2 566.2 545.3 1.2 5.8 6.1 -0.2 -6.5 -6.8
China 830.8 -164.6 575.2 3.9 -1.6 -4.4 3.0 -6.1 -2.6
Japan 3263.5 -536.2 2766.7 -4.3 -37.3 -49.3 2.0 -0.7 0.5
Rest E. Asia 1141.5 -32.5 1067.6 -81.5 -27.0 -109.8 2.1 -0.9 1.1
ASEAN 554.7 289.6 760.9 -2.6 9.8 7.1 -7.5 -24.1 -31.2
India 830.8 -216.0 610.9 -6.9 -8.1 -16.6 22.5 -26.9 -4.6
Canada 674.5 -112.9 551.3 1.4 9.7 11.0 0.3 -2.4 -1.8
USA 87.5 957.0 1292.6 14.5 -68.3 -99.4 2.1 -10.7 -18.4
Mexico 321.2 -208.1 108.9 -0.1 6.3 5.8 4.2 -3.5 1.0
Argentina 46.3 259.4 270.1 -0.1 -2.4 -2.2 0.0 -1.8 -1.6
Brazil 162.2 888.0 1098.6 -3.0 -5.4 -10.3 1.2 -5.0 -4.3
EU25 5586.4 -1255.9 4276.2 -72.6 -494.1 -582.3 15.5 -33.0 -19.9
SSA-1 -1.4 -42.5 -50.0 3.9 91.4 111.8 -1.1 48.2 53.5
SSA-2 -38.9 -126.8 -184.2 168.2 527.9 772.4 17.0 66.4 91.2
World 16400.2 -12.2 16387.8 3.6 -4.6 -1.6 62.5 -0.2 62.3
 
Sources: simulation results. 
*: results reported in this panel are due to the multilateral tariff cuts only. 
**: results reported in this panel are due to deepening and widening preferences only.  
***: results reported in this panel are due to broadening preferences only. 
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Appendix Table 1. Base case export volumes of SSA-1 (million US$)  
 Australia 
& New 
Zealand China Japan ASEAN India Canada USA Mexico
Argenti-
na Brazil EU25
Mid-east 
N. Africa
S Afr,
Custom
Union SSA-1 SSA-2 World
  
Paddy rice 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0.1 1.3 2.5
Wheat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 0.3 0.6
Grains 0.3 0.4 0.9 0.6 0.1 0.5 3.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 8.1 0.6 0.2 10.5 9.3 36.7
Vege 
&fruits 0.5 0.6 3 3.9 53.6 1.3 6.7 0.3 0.2 0.3 56.8 5.6 2.7 1.2 4.8 145.9
Oil seed 0 0.1 11.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.8 0 0 0 4.8 1.2 2.9 0.6 1.5 25
Plant fibers 0 3.4 0.7 18.3 13.8 0.1 0 0.1 0 0 39.3 1.4 12.3 0.6 7.2 112.6
Other crops 11.1 2.5 70.1 105.3 3.7 2.9 115 10.6 1.8 2.1 505 50 22.3 34.6 79.1 1106.1
Other aminal 
products 0.1 1.9 1.3 2 1 0.2 3.5 0.2 0 0 10.9 2.8 1.1 1 1.9 50
wool 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0.5
Bovine meats 0 0 0.1 0.1 0 0.1 0.4 0 0 0 0.9 0.1 0 0 0 2.2
Other meats 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 0 0.1 1 0.1 0 0 2.6 0.2 0.1 1.2 1.6 8.5
Vege oils 0 0 0.1 0.9 0 0 0.3 0 0 0 0.5 0 1.7 0.9 2.3 7.4
Dairy 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.2
Rice 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0.3 0 0 0 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.4 3.3 5.6
sugar 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 16.7 0 0 0.5 37.3 7 1 10.8 44.3 118.8
Other food 0.7 1.3 39.3 12.4 0.2 1 11.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 393 6.2 10.7 3.3 29.5 538.7
Beverage 
Tobacco 0.3 0.3 1 0.4 0 0.5 3.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 8.4 0.6 1.2 0.3 3.3 22.8
total agfood  13.2 10.7 128.5 145.1 72.8 7.3 164.8 12.2 2.7 3.3 1073 76.3 56.4 66 190.2 2193.7
Total 28.8 104.3 290.6 290 124.4 36.5 643.4 26.6 10.2 14 3206.8 268.8 576.5 130.9 285.4 6614.2
 
Sources: GTAP database version 6. 
Note: For presentation purposes, numbers smaller than 1 million US dollars are shaded in the table. 
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Appendix Table 2. Base case export volumes of SSA-2 (million US$) 
  
 Australia
& New
Zealand China Japan ASEAN India Canada USA Mexico
Argenti-
na Brazil EU25
Mid-east
N. Africa
S Afr,
Custom
Union SSA-1 SSA-2 World 
  
Paddy rice 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0.2 0 0 0.1 7.4 7.9 
Wheat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.7 1.3 0 0.2 2.5 8.1 
Grains 0.3 0.7 1.3 0.6 0.1 0.6 4.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 12.6 4.7 0.1 0.2 12.1 53.5 
Vege 
&fruits 0.3 0.6 5.3 2.9 60.7 0.5 8.2 0.4 0.1 0.4 724.9 17.6 0.8 0.3 40.1 883.6 
Oil seed 0 0.1 31.3 1.1 0.1 0.9 6.9 0 0 0 65.2 102.7 1.3 0.3 6 300.5 
Plant fibers 0.3 3.2 3.4 194.7 107.5 2.8 0.4 7.4 0 32.3 261.5 73.4 2.5 0.3 33.4 891.8 
Other crops 6.8 10.9 83.8 34.1 11.6 45.4 346.8 6.7 0.9 18.1 2195.1 225.6 9 10.6 151.5 3474 
Other aminal 
products 0.1 3.4 1.7 7.7 12.3 0.6 7.7 0.9 0 0.1 74.7 7.5 0.4 1.1 5.8 154.1 
wool 0.2 0.3 0.9 0.4 1.7 0.3 2.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 5.6 0.4 0.1 0 0.1 14.2 
Bovine meats 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0 0.1 1.1 0.1 0 0 3.4 22.7 0.1 0.5 0.5 30.1 
Other meats 0.2 1 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.5 2.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 16.5 1.5 0.3 3.2 11 40.2 
Vege oils 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.2 0 0.2 8.9 0.1 0 0 86.9 0.3 0.1 4.1 45.7 154.8 
Dairy 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 0 0.1 0.7 0 0 0 9.1 1.6 0.1 1.4 16 31.1 
Rice 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.4 2.9 0.2 0.1 0.1 5.8 0.5 0.1 0.1 17.5 30.3 
sugar 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.2 15.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 295 1.4 0 0.5 17.6 338.6 
Other food 9.3 28.9 104.6 59.4 1 8.4 69.7 4.6 1.3 1.9 1465.1 22.2 14.1 20.1 234.5 2180 
Beverage 
Tobacco 0.8 1.1 6.1 1.7 0.3 2.1 15.6 0.8 0.4 0.4 42.1 2.3 0.4 4.9 85.7 173.6 
total agfood  19.4 51.7 242 305.3 195.7 63.5 497.3 22 3.4 53.9 5277.3 493.2 30 47.9 728.9 8835.8 
Total 144.4 2281.5 1271.5 1226.3 680.4 405.4 14625.9 218.2 109.5 1453.9 21176.1 1300.2 1537.2 381.7 2118.9 53253 
 
Sources: GTAP database version 6. 
Note: For presentation purposes, numbers smaller than 1 million US dollars are shaded in the table. 
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Appendix Table 3. Changes in exports of selected agriculture and food products from SSA-1 and SSA-2 
  
 Multilateral MFN tariff cuts* 
Multilateral MFN tariff cuts + deepening and wid-
ening preferences** 
Multilateral MFN tariff cuts + deepening & widen-
ing + broadening preferences*** 
 
Export volume 
(million US$) % change 
Export volume 
(million US$) % change 
Export volume 
(million US$) % change 
 SSA-1 SSA-2 SSA-1 SSA-2 SSA-1 SSA-2 SSA-1 SSA-2 SSA-1 SSA-2 SSA-1 SSA-2 
  
Grains 35.8 48.4 -2.6 -9.5 36.3 48.6 1.3 0.4 36.3 49.1 0.1 0.9 
vege &fruits 130.0 810.1 -10.9 -8.3 130.2 1109.0 0.2 36.9 212.3 1192.5 63.0 7.5 
oil seeds 25.2 236.1 0.7 -21.5 25.5 403.7 1.2 71.0 25.2 398.8 -1.3 -1.2 
plant fibers 112.9 896.5 0.3 0.5 108.3 841.8 -4.1 -6.1 113.3 910.7 4.6 8.2 
other crops 1040.6 3322.0 -5.9 -4.4 1078.7 3047.9 3.7 -8.3 1137.6 3104.8 5.5 1.9 
bovine meats 1.6 25.8 -26.0 -14.4 1.9 24.4 17.6 -5.5 2.1 25.0 12.6 2.7 
other meats 7.5 36.4 -11.4 -9.4 9.7 53.8 28.9 47.6 14.6 61.6 50.5 14.5 
vege oils 6.8 142.7 -8.4 -7.8 6.5 130.0 -4.5 -8.9 6.8 129.4 5.5 -0.5 
dairy 1.1 29.3 -8.0 -5.8 3.3 47.9 191.6 63.5 3.3 49.1 1.1 2.6 
rice 5.7 30.9 2.3 1.8 5.5 28.8 -3.7 -6.6 5.3 28.5 -3.8 -1.1 
sugar 93.6 169.9 -21.3 -49.8 411.6 2507.8 339.9 1376.1 402.6 2499.4 -2.2 -0.3 
other food 508.3 2058.1 -5.6 -5.6 513.7 2034.3 1.1 -1.2 511.4 2079.8 -0.4 2.2 
Total Ag &food 2052.1 8226.2 -6.5 -6.9 2415.3 10697.5 17.7 30.0 2555.7 10960.3 5.8 2.5 
Total 6569.2 52985.5 -0.7 -0.5 6674.8 53948.0 1.6 1.8 6718.2 54071.2 0.7 0.2 
 
Sources: simulation results. 
*: results reported in this panel are due to the multilateral tariff cuts only. 
**: results reported in this panel are due to deepening and widening preferences only.  
***: results reported in this panel are due to broadening preferences only. 
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